The first case concerns a CVM rule on disclosure of executive compensation and the its interpretation by local courts. The second case refers to the adoption of suitability rules.
Introduction

Background
The Foreign investors have played a crucial role in the expansion of the Brazilian stock market, especially, in public offerings. In 2009, 66.7% of the participating investors were foreigners; in 2008, 65.6%; in 2007, 72.3%; in 2006, 72.8%; in 2005, 61.7%; and in 2004, 69.2% 6 . With respect to the trading value, foreign investors' share corresponds to roughly 3 According to the exchange rates available at <http://www.bcb.gov.br/> on June 2, 2012, BRL 2.52 roughly equals EUR 1. 4 BM&FBovespa is São Paulo's Securities, Commodities and Futures Exchange. According to information available at <http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/en-us/intros/intro-about-us.aspx?idioma=en-us>, BM&FBovespa was created in 2008, through the integration between the São Paulo Stock Exchange (Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo) and the Brazilian Mercantile & Futures Exchange (Bolsa de Mercadorias e Futuros). 5 Data referring to public offerings annual amounts and to the evolution of the daily financial volumes were extracted from BM&FBovespa Annual Report of 2009, pages 43 and 38, respectively, available at <http://ri.bmfbovespa.com.br/upload/portal_investidores/pt/informacoes_financeiras/relatorios_anuais/relatorioanual-2010.pdf> (last visited: June 17, 2010) . Data about BM&Fbovespa's international rankings were extracted from the Companies Bulletin n. 14, Second Year, available at <http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/empresas/ boletim_empresas.asp> (last visited: May 31, 2012 . In a nutshell, in the Brazilian secondary market, foreign investors and institutional investors amount to over 60% of the daily trading volume.
Moving away from the stock market towards the Brazilian regulatory framework, it is also possible to realize remarkable changes since 2000. Such changes did not arise out of ordinary State legislative activity, but rather stemmed from BM&FBovespa's (at that time, simply Bovespa) private regulations creating different levels of corporate governance by the end of 2000, which were strongly inspired in international good practice standards and policy discussions. This was followed by amendments to the Brazilian Stock Corporations Act (Law No. 6,404/1976) , which strengthened minority shareholders' economic and political rights 9 , as well as to the Brazilian Exchange Act (Law No. 6,385/1976) . Furthermore, in the meantime, Bovespa was demutualized and internationally accepted self-regulating models were implemented. bmfbovespa.com.br/informe/default.asp> (last visited: May 31, 2012) . Data referring to the other years were extracted from "A guide to the Brazilian economy", prepared by Credit Suisse, September 11, 2009. 7 Broken down by year such participation is as follows : 2005, 32.8%; 2006, 35.5%; 2007, 34.5%; 2008, 35.3%; and 2009, 34 .2%. Data extracted from BM&FBovespa's Annual Report of 2009, page 41, available at <http://ri.bmfbovespa.com.br/upload/portal_investidores/pt/informacoes_financeiras/relatorios_anuais/relatorioanual-2010.pdf> (last visited: May 31, 2012) . 8 Year by year the participation was: 2005, 37.5%; 2006, 27.2%; 2007, 29.8%; 2008, 27.1%; and 2009, 25 .7%. Data extracted from BM&FBovespa's Annual Report of 2009, page 41, available at <http://ri.bmfbovespa.com.br/upload/portal_investidores/pt/informacoes_financeiras/relatorios_anuais/relatorioanual-2010.pdf> (last visited: May 31, 2012) . 9 In terms of enhanced protection to minority shareholders, Law No. 10,303/2001 has set forth stricter rules for delisting; new advantages for preferred stock issued by listed companies; extended deadline for calling general shareholders' meetings of listed companies; right to appoint members of the Executive Board (Conselho de Administração), besides the right to multiple vote; duty of the controlling shareholders and administrators to inform their positions with respect to securities issued by the company; right to tag along for 80% of the price paid per share to the controlling shareholder. 10 Law No. 10,303/2001 extended the list of securities and enlarged CVM's competence to regulate collective investment contracts and derivatives. CVM was granted greater autonomy as a fixed term of office for its directors was established, as well as a higher budget. Furthermore, the use of privileged information and market manipulation were criminalized. 11 Law No. 11,638/2007. 12 Among others, we could mention CVM Ordinance No. 480/2009, which has set rules (closely related to international patterns) for the submission of information to be disclosed by issuing companies; CVM Ordinance
Scope and limitations
The introductory note above suggests that some interest does exist in Brazil towards the adoption of regulatory patterns which are internationally promoted, especially, in view of the importance of foreign capital and institutional investors for the proper functioning of the Brazilian domestic market. In this paper, we intend to describe how transnational regulation is adopted in Brazil, as well as to give some thought on the hurdles involved in this implementation process.
In order to pursue such goal, we have made two choices. The first one refers to the international institution we selected to verify the transposition of rules. The second choice concerns the adopted methodology with the aim of drawing some conclusions.
Our object of study comprises the principles issued by the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). This choice is justified, on the one side, by the influence which such organization exercises in the regulatory activity of CVM; and, on the other side, by the recent increasing participation of Brazil in IOSCO. An inherent limitation associated with the choice to study specifically IOSCO stems from the plurality of sectoral standard setters often addressing complex and interrelated financial market matters.
As such, it is important to bear in mind that possible interferences among such international regulators are not to be ignored but rather acknowledged. In other words, IOSCO is not to be perceived in vacuo, but rather as part of a network formed by national regulators, other standard setting bodies and international organizations, whose members participate in more than one (if not in all) of such structures. Although, one could expect that the power exercised by dominant states in one or more international financial regulation fora could play a role in shaping the international agenda, we will not carry out a political analysis of IOSCO in this sense 13 . No. 471/2008 , which has simplified securities issuance with "restricted efforts"; CVM Ordinance No. 457/2007, which adopted the international accounting standards set by IASB (International Accounting Standards Board); CVM Ordinance No. 481/2009, which regulates the request to have voting rights in shareholders' general meetings exercised by an appointed attorney-in-fact, considering that there are (not many, but still some) Brazilian companies which ownership is not concentrated; CVM Ordinance No. 361/2002, which has regulated the several types of public offerings ; and CVM Ordinance No. 461/2007 and 468/2008 , which have set rules for the organization of stock exchanges so as to enable demutualization, as well as reviewed regulatory competence issues related to the stock exchange and its relationship with CVM. 13 Also, any relations between the interstate, domestic and transnational political arenas could help explaining how consensus is achieved and why certain values and objectives become priorities for international financial reforms. These considerations matter, however, an essentially political analysis of the financial regulatory Turning to our second choice, we have opted for the case study methodology as the only feasible way of demonstrating how transnational principles are adopted in the Brazilian legal system and how Brazilian players and institutions (both public and private) cause the application of rules, which are strongly inspired by international standards, to be reinforced, mitigated or even avoided. Case studies should not vouch for making general, universal conclusions. However, a detailed factual analysis of specific cases allows us to better understand the underlying dynamic in the adoption of international standards including the constraints and possibilities for the enforcement of such rules, as well as to possibly conclude that the resulting rule may turn out to be different in terms of its content as compared to the initially intended rule.
To be precise, we focus our analysis on the IOSCO principles in view of two Brazilian case studies relating respectively to disclosure of officers' compensation and to suitability.
International policy formation in the field of financial regulation depends to a large extent on consensus among national regulators and self-regulatory organizations. Although there has been increasingly more cooperation among such regulators and organizations and a certain level of convergence of market regulatory standards at the transnational level, implementation and enforcement of rules remains essentially domestic. Our two Brazilian case studies illustrate this tension between the transnational and domestic dimensions of regulation of financial markets, which in turn are global by their very nature.
Research questions
The main research question, as the paper title reveals, refers to an implementation test:
is the enforcement of transnational regulation by domestic legal systems possible? In case the answer to such question is positive, a further question arises: are there any local particularities which affect the final result of the process for adoption of transnational principles? In order to start answering such question, our analysis if twofold:
sphere, as mentioned above, is out of the scope of the paper. The bottom line is to emphasize that any "coincidences" in international financial regulation arise for a reason and that a regulatory trend is to be perceived as a product of discussions and work in different organizations and at different levels in such a way that the importance of any of these organizations would better be assessed in relation to a fragmented, weak institutional background (as detailed in Section 2 below) and never separately or isolated from this context. In order to pave the way to such analysis, we first turn to the international dimension and introduce relevant background considerations about international policy formation in the context of financial regulatory fragmentation, so as to better understand the role played by IOSCO (Section 2). Afterwards, we turn to Brazil and how this country participates in IOSCO. We also briefly refer to other international and regional organizations dealing with financial regulation in which Brazil or any of its domestic regulators and/or associations are members (Section 3). Finally, Section 4 presents the two Brazilian case studies illustrating how international financial standards might face the so-called "constitutionality test" before been enforced and how rule making at the domestic level inspired by transnational regulation may arise out of self-regulatory activity and not directly out of traditional administrative legislative competence.
International Policy Formation
In this section, we introduce an overview of the international financial architecture in order to properly identify IOSCO as one of the standard setting bodies taking part in a dense, complex network of transnational regulators and informal fora related to international financial regulation, which comprises key subject matters that in practice are hard to isolate from one another, such as securities, banking, insurance and accounting. In order to accomplish this purpose we outline a brief historical analysis addressing how the international financial regulatory system developed into a fragmented institutional structure.
After getting a grasp of the international institutional context, we attempt to 
1 International Financial Architecture: a brief outlook
The first relevant insight about the international financial architecture which should be taken into consideration is that the system has developed a clear mismatch: while international financial regulation bears a relatively fragmented, weak institutional structure, finance itself is globally integrated. Not only that, but in contrast to the so-called Bretton Woods system and its single framework of the GATT/WTO, the international financial system is composed by a plurality of mostly informal (non-state based) regulatory mechanisms and regulators. At the same time, the international financial system is one of the most densely regulated areas of international economic law The next relevant step -and a quite intuitive one -refers to the first efforts to address the fragmentation resulting from such "patchwork of sectoral regulatory bodies"
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. In this sense, the BCBS, IAIS and IOSCO created the "Joint Forum" in 1996 in order to discuss overlapping issues across the banking, insurance and securities markets. Finally, three years afterwards, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) was set up bringing together the standard setting bodies (BCBS, IAIS, IOSCO, IASB and CPSS), the international economic organizations (the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, OECD, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Committee on the Global Financial System), as well as national financial authorities.
Regulatory fragmentation
Despite the efforts mentioned above towards mitigating regulatory overlapping by bringing together financial regulators, international economic organizations and standard setting bodies, fragmentation remained a fundamental deficiency in the international financial regulatory system. Not only that, but it also is important to highlight another prominent feature of the international financial regulatory regime, i.e. the inherent limitation of its institutions to be confined to facilitating informal cooperation, information-sharing and consensus formation, but lacking any supranational powers to legally bind countries at the national level. This core critic applies to the whole international financial regulatory system and by default also to IOSCO.
In relation to the regulatory fragmentation problem, it is interesting to note the direct relation which has been established between the FSB and the aim of a greater accountability 18 RUDDIGKEIT, op. cit., note 12 supra, p. 8. 19 The FSB Charta is available at <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_090925d.pdf>. 20 HELLEINER; PAGLIARI, op. cit., note 13 supra, p. 8. 21 RUDDIGKEIT, op. cit., note 12 supra, p. 11. Traditionally, it is pointed out that by the very nature of the relevant issues related to securities regulation and their less obvious distributional effects central bankers and financial regulators enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy from domestic legislative assemblies. As a result, the range of actors involved in discussions about financial regulation is much less representative than in other economic areas as trade politics for instance. This argument can be easily extended to the international arena if we consider that IOSCO member regulators have been more accountable to self-regulatory organizations (SROs) and private market participants than to traditional government oversight mechanisms, which yields to a poorly In this vein, it is significant to note that IOSCO works in close consultation with private international regulatory bodies as the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) and the International Capital Markets Association, which is a self-regulating association of dealers on primary and secondary international capital markets. In addition, it is possible to infer from the last annual reports published by IOSCO 26 that its officials find it important to incorporate industry inputs into the standard setting process so as to focus on policy matters of relevance to practitioners and industry bodies. This strongly suggests the hermetic modus operandi of international securities regulation and harmonization as it has been exercised by IOSCO.
IOSCO
Nevertheless, it is important to mention, as noted by Helleiner and Pagliari 27 that the largescale use of taxpayers' money to rescue financial institutions during the last financial crisis has greatly politicized financial regulation causing legislative bodies to get more involved in the subject matter as popular pressure for stronger regulation unleashes.
Another important consideration refers to the fact that IOSCO, by definition, seeks to regulate most prominently the activities of international financial conglomerates, which businesses comprise both banking and securities divisions. Even where an argument can be made that sophisticated financial institutions adopt Chinese wall mechanisms and prevent conflicts of interests while having its different departments assisting clients, the bottom line is that IOSCO's standards do not cover all the activities performed by such institutions. As a result, once more, the problem of regulatory fragmentation and inherent gaps, on the one hand, and overlapping rules, on the other hand, are to be taken into account while assessing IOSCO's object of regulation.
Considering that a full analytical assessment of what is meant by international securities regulation in the framework of IOSCO is hardly feasible, we intend to now explore the three main IOSCO's bodies of output. i. "Principle 6: The Regulator should have or contribute to a process to monitor, mitigate and manage systemic risk, appropriate to its mandate"
ii. "Principle 7: The Regulator should have or contribute to a process to review the perimeter of regulation regularly"
iii. "Principle 8: The Regulator should seek to ensure that conflicts of interest and misalignment of incentives are avoided, eliminated, disclosed or otherwise managed" iv. "Principle 19: Auditors should be subject to adequate levels of oversight" v. "Principle 20: Auditors should be independent of the issuing entity that they audit" vi. "Principle 22: Credit rating agencies should be subject to adequate levels of oversight. The regulatory system should ensure that credit rating agencies whose ratings are used for regulatory purposes are subject to registration and ongoing supervision" . In fact, this stems from the already mentioned principle of consensus, which is common to transnational networks as IOSCO. However, to the extent that reversing financial globalization is not possible, that a global government is hardly desired and that the establishment of a single global financial regulator is not enforceable in the medium term, transnational and transgovernmental networks are considered indispensable.
Based or not in the fact that coordination (once achieved) is self-sustaining, the bottom line is that there are no dispute resolution nor enforcement mechanisms for the compliance with IOSCO's standards. As a result, some scholars consider that such system does not attempt to substantially harmonize securities laws and further that such persisting discrepancies cause foreign judgments not to be recognized and enforced whenever they go beyond a "comfort zone", which could be defined as areas in which domestic preferences are somehow aligned 34 .
Brazil in the International Financial Architecture
In this section, we analyze Brazil's participation in international and regional organizations and fora with the mere intent to illustrate two main perceptions: on the one hand, that Brazil broadly takes part in the international financial regulatory structures both at the transnational and at the regional level, and on the other hand, that Brazil now plays an increasingly prominent role as a big emerging economy which passed the financial health and soundness test after the last financial crisis.
Instead of trying to gauge the extent to which Brazil actually shapes the international financial regulatory agenda or defines the content of international standards and principles, which would presuppose a deep assessment of Brazil's most direct interests in the context of financial regulation, we will simply refer to the main organizations in which the country or any of its domestic regulators and/or associations are members.
33 VERDIER, op. cit., note 22 supra, p. 150. 34 VERDIER, op. cit., note 22 supra, p. 147. 
Brazil and IOSCO
CVM
Brazil and other international and regional organizations and fora
Firstly, it is important to note that a membership broadening trend has been taking place after the burst of the last financial crisis and in view of the perception that regulatory financial bodies were undemocratic and of reduced effectiveness since developing countries were not represented in the most relevant fora regarded by some scholars, others consider that a potential downside will be that consensus is to become even more difficult to reach in the years to come 36 . Secondly, it should be emphasized that Brazil's participation in fora of the international monetary and financial order is be understood in light of recent changes in its economy and its performance in the global financial crisis, which conferred it much more of the so-called "soft-power", even though Brazilian participation in the world economy is still relatively small. This is evidenced by the fact that Brazil became a country member of the Secondly, CVM is one of the 26 members of COSRA, which is a forum formed in 1992 for mutual cooperation and aiming at enhancing the efforts of each country in North, South, and Central America (including the Caribbean) to develop and foster the growth of sound securities markets. Thirdly, Brazil is a member of the IIMV, a non-profitable organization which was set up on May 20, 1999 and which main objectives are to promote a better knowledge of the structure and regulatory environment of the securities market of the region, to develop transparency and integrity in this market.
Brazilian Case Studies
The present section is dedicated to our two case studies describing the implementation of the transparency principle applied to executive compensation in the Brazilian legal system, on the one hand, and the adoption of suitability requirements as a result of self-regulatory activity, on the other hand. First of all, however, we outline some relevant considerations regarding the development of the Brazilian capital market during the past twenty years in order to provide some context to the case study analysis following the next and final section of the paper.
Background note on the recent development of the Brazilian capital market
Since the 1990s there has been a gradual opening of the Brazilian capital market to foreign investments, following the opening of the Brazilian economy after a long period of dictatorial regime. After the privatization of important state controlled companies during the 1990s and the enlargement of the domestic capital market during the second half of the 2000s, a growing number of international investors have been active in the Brazilian capital market.
As referred in Section 1 above, there is evidence of internationalization of Brazilian securities regulations. This is to be evidenced, for instance, in view of the enactment of a federal statute adopting the IFRS, as well as of administrative regulations issued by CVM on enhanced information disclosure by listed companies, on regulation of credit rating agencies and on short selling. Moreover, self-regulation mechanisms including the creation of BM&FBovespa's Novo Mercado, which is a listing segment adopting international patterns of corporate governance, also reinforce this trend.
Considering that it would not be reasonable or feasible to try to understand the implementation of international standards in its entirety, which by nature is a complex phenomenon, we believe that carrying out specific case studies already is enough to meet the goal of pointing out relevant questions related to what we could call internationalization of the Brazilian financial regulation. The two case studies are summarized below.
Case Study I: Executive compensation transparency
How is executive compensation regulated by IOSCO?
The global financial crisis of 2008 has proven that executive compensation programs and their cornerstones are key issues of utmost importance for understanding the incentives behind the predatory behavior of financial institutions in the financial system. As a consequence, executive compensation has since then been often included among regulatory recommendations and guidelines issued by international organizations to their members. . According to these principles, data regarding the administrators' remuneration is included among the relevant information to be disclosed by listed companies. Such data would be relevant for the investor to perceive the existing incentives in order to achieve given goals of the issuer company ("they can assess the incentives created by this use of the issuer's resources"), as well as to realize whether such incentives are aligned with the investor's interests and how performance may be oriented to the returns generated for shareholders 40 .
To be precise, disclosure of the following information is suggested: (i) a description of the issuer's decision-making process for its compensation policies, including the composition and mandate of any remuneration committee; (ii) the most important design characteristics of the compensation system including how those characteristics may be tied to performance and, where appropriate, risk; and (iii) quantitative information on compensation, broken down as appropriate to indicate incentives underlying the compensation, together with any necessary 37 Available at: <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904b.pdf>. 38 "9. Firms must disclose clear, comprehensive and timely information about their compensation practices to facilitate constructive engagement by all stakeholders. Stakeholders need to be able to evaluate the quality of support for the firm's strategy and risk posture. Appropriate disclosure related to risk management and other control systems will enable a firm's counterparties to make informed decisions about their business relations with the firm. Supervisors should have access to all information they need to evaluate the conformance of practice to the Principles." 39 Available at: <http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD317.pdf>. CVM Public Hearing Notice No. 07/2008, Item 11.8. 46 This argument refers to the fact that Brazil is culturally different compared to countries in which the individual disclosure is mandatory. In other cultures it is more common and natural to share information regarding one's assets and income, and well paid individuals are considered successful and competent. In Brazil, people tend not It is interesting to mention the results of this public consultation initiative. Only 7 interested parties were in favor of the new proposed rules and 24 were against them. Among these last 24 responses, 15 were in favor of the disclosure of remuneration paid to each management body, but not to each individual member 48 . Not only there were not many replies in favor of the individual disclosure with identification of the respective companies' officers, but even these few supporters, which understood that the new rules would in theory be beneficial to the Brazilian securities market, have asserted that it was still not the appropriate time for the adoption in Brazil of such transparency standards. In other words, it was generally understood that the downside of disclosing individual compensation information would not be compensated by potential benefits. Finally, the rule created in Brazil ended up requiring that officers' compensation policy be disclosed, including information about the composition of the compensation, the objectives of each of its components, the reasons justifying the compensation composition as being well tuned to the evolution of the performance indexes, and whether such policy is aligned to short, medium or long run interests. Moreover, disclosure is required for compensation amounts of each management body (but without identifying the individual amounts paid to each officer), as well as for the highest, the lowest and the average of the individual compensation amounts. intermediary accepts primary responsibility for these matters". After the 2008 financial meltdown, however, the duty to assess whether the product and/or service were suitable for the client has been perceived as quite elusive and would, therefore, require greater care and attention from regulators, especially in the case of complex financial products.
Even without having had resulted in the issuance of international rules, we would like to mention a study about suitability prepared by the Joint Forum In 2006 CVM discussed with market players whether an investor should be considered as a qualified investor by the simple fact that he or her had invested at least BRL 300,000 (approximately EUR 120,000). This discussion further developed into a broader one referring to the convenience of administrative regulation imposing the duty to verify the suitability of the product for the client, in addition to the already existing rules which were pitched at a very general level. In the following year of 2007, CVM published a document about the suitability test for public comments. This document referred to how the matter is regulated in the United States, in the European Union and in the UK; however, no normative ordinance was issued as a result of this initiative.
In 2009 the matter was once again raised in policy discussions in Brazil; however, CVM decided to leave suitability out of its ordinance on rules and proceedings for securities transactions in regulated markets and recommended that the issue should be addressed in a -161947-899.pdf> (last visited: June 1, 2012) . Article 2 of this rule suggests that the following should be regulated: (i) assessment of the profile of clients or beneficiaries, including their financial situation, knowledge or experience with the products and services offered or recommended by the supervised institutions, as well as the purpose of the purchase or contract; (ii) assessment of the suitability of the products or services offered or recommended to the profile of the clients and the beneficiaries and their purposes; (iii) updating the information received from clients and regulatory institutions for setting rules on the duty to assess the suitability of products or services offered or recommended to the needs, interests and objectives pursued by clients.
However, it was only in December 2010 that a suitability regulation was issued in Brazil. The initiative was taken by ANBIMA in its self-regulatory activity. ANBIMA members comprise commercial and multiservice banks, investment banks, fund managers, securities brokers and distributors, as well as private assets managers. beneficiaries periodically in a suitable fashion in view of the nature of the products and services purchased or contracted; (iv) identifying mismatches between the clients' or beneficiaries' profile and the products or services acquired or contracted; and (v) actions to be taken whenever there are mismatches between the clients' or beneficiaries' profile and the products or services.
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Available at: <http://portal.anbima.com.br/distribuicao/regulacao/codigo-de-private-banking/Documents/ Codigo%20Private%20Banking.pdf> (last visited: May 28, 2012) .
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Available at: <http://portal.anbima.com.br/tesouraria/regulacao/codigo-de-mercado-aberto/Documents/ Deliberacao%2010.pdf> (last visited: May 28, 2012) . 68 Available at: <http://www.cvm.gov.br/port/audi/ed1511sdm.pdf> (last visited: May 28, 2012) . 
Case Analysis
Despite the importance of international fora for transnational rule making, the emergence of applicable regulation and the possibilities for its implementation take place on the domestic level. Both case studies provide us with some tools to consider how the transnational and the national levels interact and what the tension between these two dimensions is. In other words, the discussion above allows us to think about the limits and possibilities in the implementation of transnational principles in domestic markets. The matters to be taken into consideration in order to draw these concluding remarks are threefold:
How transnational principles enter into national systems;
2.
The content of domestic rules inspired by international principles; and 3. Domestic enforcement of such rules and how it impacts the implementation of the new rules.
How transnational principles enter into national systems
First of all, we would like to refer to the nature of the domestic players involved in the implementation of transnational principles in the Brazilian legal system. In the executive compensation case, we have verified that it was CVM -in the exercise of its rule making competence -that issued a regulation adopting international standards and even justified the creation of new domestic rules making express reference to international policy fora. This case study illustrates the most common phenomenon, at least in Brazil, which is the issuance of securities regulations by the regulatory agency which has been granted specific normative powers to do so by law. Administrative rule making by CVM certainly facilitates a swift approval of new rules as compared to traditional law making, since political hurdles -as for instance, exposure to conflicting political interests and need to be on the top of the Senate's political agenda -are avoided.
A different situation was described in the second case study. Initially, CVM took the lead and openly discussed the suitability duty with market players and domestic organizations; however, subsequently, it was ANBIMA in its self-regulatory activity who requested its members to adopt suitability rules. Such private regulation came before any administrative rules were issued by CVM and actually currently corresponds to the most detailed regulation of suitability in Brazil. Recently CVM started considering the adoption of suitability rules and, should new rules come into force, we will have a hybrid system in Brazil with both private and public regulations. Therefore, we realize that international principles might enter the Brazilian legal system both by means of private or public regulatory activity. its regulatory competence), as well as upon self-regulatory activity. The limit is to be found in Brazilian domestic mandatory rules. In case of conflict with existing Brazilian laws or even with the Brazilian federal constitution, the adoption of these principles would only be possible if new rules were to be issued following the traditional rule making procedure, which at its turn implies considerable political and time costs.
The content of domestic rules inspired by international principles
When it comes to assessing the substantive content of domestic rules adopted in view of international principles and the harmonization of financial regulations across the world, the highly controversial one-size-fits-all idea emerges. The case studies above demonstrated that the international standard was adapted to local specificities upon transposition into the Brazilian legal system.
In the procedure of adoption of the new rules and public hearing, CVM acknowledged market restraints and interests and ended up limiting the extent of the transparency rule for disclosure of executive compensation in Brazil. In this case, we realized that the information to be disclosed was limited to the highest, lowest and average amount paid to officers, which compared to the international standard represents a rather lax rule.
In the suitability case study, we verified that currently there is only one IOSCO open principle. On February 21, 2012, IOSCO published the consultation report "Suitability Requirements with respect to the Distribution of Complex Financial Products" setting out nine principles relating to customer protections, including suitability and disclosure obligations, which relate to the distribution by intermediaries of complex financial products to retail and non-retail customers 72 . In any case, with reference to the already existing IOSCO principle, it should be noted that the choice in terms of which mechanism is to be adopted for the implementation of this international standard in the domestic level is left to be made locally. However, CVM expressly refers to the European rule as the main source of inspiration for the proposed regulation submitted to public hearing, even though it also specifically mentions IOSCO principles as well. This case demonstrates that general 72 The closing date for responses was May 21, 2012. principles issued by IOSCO may strongly inspire domestic regulations; however, the source to concretely think about the rule to be adopted is to be found in different legal systems.
What are the possibility and the limit? The limit refers to the need to adapt the general rule to local particularities (which will become clearer when we discuss enforcement below).
The possibility, conversely, lays in the adoption of open international principles allowing tailored domestic rules to be created accordingly.
Domestic enforcement of such rules and how it impacts the implementation of the new rules
Are This conflict of interests was well illustrated in the arguments raised respectively by CVM and IBEF in the course of the judicial proceedings in Brazil. CVM, among other reasons, argues that the new rule is accepted internationally as a paramount for good corporate governance and is related to the development of the Brazilian securities market. IBEF, at its turn, defended the need to keep compensation information confidential due to Brazilian cultural specificities. Both arguments are legitimate and fragile. The case study reveals an attempt of dialogue between international principles and local values. Domestic enforcement of such rules and how it impacts the implementation of the new rules. Moreover, the executive compensation case was the first case study, which has allowed us to consider the restraints and the consequent tailoring of international rules being imported to the Brazilian legal system.
The most important take away is that it is not possible to fully foresee what the outcome will be while implementing imported standards. The issuance of domestic rules inspired by transnational principles is only the first step, as the new rules will necessarily be tested by local institutions responsible for the supervision and enforcement in the domestic level. In fact, it is often to be expected that the final domestic rule will differ from the international rule exclusively inspired in foreign markets -and this phenomenon is to be verified not only in Brazil but in various jurisdictions across the globe. We refer, for instance, 
Concluding remarks
In view of the case studies and discussion above, we now shall address the research questions proposed in Section 1. According to the Brazilian experience, we can say that the enforcement of transnational regulation by domestic legal systems is indeed possible.
Furthermore, considering the growing integration of financial markets and the interest in attracting foreign capital flows to domestic markets, it is possible to assert that implementing transnational regulations is not only possible, but also completely aligned to local interests in participating in international organizations and enhancing Brazil's "soft power" in such fora. The transposition of transnational regulations into the local system can not, however, take place without certain restrictions. The main restriction lays in the fact that the transnational rule has to "fit" in an existing domestic legal system, i.e. it may not violate constitutional principles and mandatory laws which are already in force. In case of any such a conflict of rules, the restriction may only be overcome if the deep, necessary changes are undertaken in the existing legal system and if the political challenges associated with the legislative procedure are tacked. This is probably the reason why securities and exchange regulatory agencies and self-regulatory entities are the main responsible agents for the transposition of transnational regulations. In any case, there is always the risk that potential conflicts between the new imported rule and the existing local rules are discussed by and before local institutions, as for instance, the local courts.
At the same time, another perceived restriction refers to the local market interests affected by the adoption of new rules inspired by transnational regulation. The more the relevant domestic interests are fine-tuned in line with the good functioning of the market, the easiest should the implementation of transnational models be. This is to be perceived especially in the cases where self-regulatory entities anticipate state regulation and set forth stricter requirements to its members than the obligations provided by the existing laws.
